First, see: Al Qaeda's Armies of One and The Worst of the Worst, both from Jarret Brachman, writing at Foreign Policy.
Comments:
• To repeat my previous remark - jihadi pundits will find it no easier to get involved in terrorist activity offline now - after Abu Dujanah's attack on FOB Chapman - than before that event. They still need motivation, association and opportunity - all Abu Duhanah al Khorasani did was increase motivation. The same goes for all other online jihadi activists - the water is wide as it ever was, and not all boatmen can be trusted.
• There is no natural progression from online to offline activism - it can go the other way as well. Tarek Mehanna comes to mind. First he tried to put together an attack on a shopping mall in Boston - and failed, due primarily to a lack of imagination and failure to seize the available opportunity. Then he tried to get training in Yemen and failed - because the opportunity, based on an associate who knew people in Yemen, was no longer available. It was then that he became so involved in online activism.
• If there is one thing that can be said with certainty after eight years of global jihad online, it is that what someone says or doesn't say online is in no way indicative of what they are doing, have done, may do, or are capable of. Not that what is said is not of interest, but what is important is where the words are spoken and who is within earshot.
Posted on 24 January 2010 @ 16:39