Internet Haganah began as a website in 2002, as a way to regularly publish information about the use of the Internet by Palestinian terrorist organizations - thus the Israeli name haganah, and the use of web logging (i.e. blogging) software. This included publishing the names and contact information for companies that provided those Terrorist organizations with services. The companies in question being mostly in the United States, it was and remains illegal for them to provide such services. Focus quickly broadened to include Islamic extremist groups in general, and al-Qaida in particular, as I became aware the involvement of Palestinian activists in the activities of al-Qaida.
The public exposure of the companies that were providing services to designated Terrorist entities had the effect of making it more difficult for those entities to operate their websites. This is the reality behind stories claiming that I "take down" websites. Making life more difficult for the operators of terrorist websites translates into increased opportunities for surveillance, infiltration, and interdiction, and so as a tactic such public exposure seemed recommended, and still has its place - though like an insecticide, over-use can create a more resistant pest. It is possible to quietly approach service providers, present them with information about who they are providing services to, and ask them nicely to cease and desist with providing such services. Circumstances in 2006-2007 enabled a transition from public exposure on sites like Internet Haganah to the more quiet approach - conducted by an increasing number of governments in Europe and the Middle East.
For the record, yes, the "body count" of websites removed from the Internet as a result of information and instructions published on the Internet Haganah site was well over 1,000. I stopped counting somewhere in the 800's, and removed the howto instructions from the website in 2007. Many of those sites never recovered from the first takedown, others persisted because they are backed by state-sponsored Terrorist organizations, while a select few continued to operate because they were allowed to do so.
By October of 2002 I was the subject of a hostile communiqué from al-Qaida leader Yusef al-Ayyeri to his followers. At the time al-Ayyeri operated one of the few genuine al-Qaida websites - al-Neda - and rather than purchasing services from companies, his webmaster would break into other people's websites and install al-Neda in an out-of-the-way location. I exposed this practice, and the Sheikh did not appreciate the publicity. Unbeknownst to al-Ayyeri, I was also working with the JTTF to try and "capture" the al-Neda site - the objective was to prevail upon a service provider to keep al-Neda online for surveillance purposes, a not unreasonable thing to do given the importance of al-Neda to al-Qaida and al-Ayyeri's links to al-Qaida leaders such as bin Laden. This effort succeeded, much to the chagrin of a football club in the Netherlands, whose website was the unwilling host of al-Neda for a considerable length of time. Sorry about that guys...
It is this combination of activism and treachery that is the hallmark of the last eight years. With the Internet Haganah site operating as a diversion, I recruited a team of volunteer agents and deployed them. SoFIR was born in 2003 as a global non-governmental transnational ad hoc intelligence network. We progressed from investigating particularly troublesome individuals (e.g. Irhabi007), to websites central to al-Qaida's online operations (e.g. al-Ekhlaas), to the networks of sites that serve al-Qaida, and perhaps most importantly, the networks of people who operate those sites. The activities of SoFIR have lasting value as a proof of concept. As was the case with taking down websites, this is work best conducted by the intelligence agencies of various countries, and by 2007 it was clear to me that those agencies were finally committed to doing more than merely observing from the sidelines. SoFIR as an intelligence operation largely ceased to exist.
The Society for Internet Research (SoFIR) is a non-profit organization conducting counterterrorism research and education in the public interest. At present the sites internet-haganah.com and sofir.org exist primarily as tool for distributing and collecting information about jihadi use of the Internet. The target audience is a core readership of 1,000 composed mostly of practitioners but including a handful of academic researchers and an even smaller number of well-informed and concerned civilians. They access this site at least once a week, sometimes more often. There are at least 29,000 other people who will come here over the course of a month. The reader is advised, however, that my sites also have a following among al-Qaida activists - knowing this, I reserve the right to publish material from time to time for the effect it will have on my adversary.
A final note: If any of the above doesn't jive with what has been reported in the mainstream media, it speaks to the pathetic state of contemporary journalism. With very few exceptions reporters approach me having already written their story - if they approach me at all - and anything I tell them that doesn't fit their narrative is ignored. The good news is that people like me don't need the mainstream media anymore than Osama bin Laden needs al-Jazeera. The gate keepers strike a curious pose, standing guard before a gate that no longer exists.
Posted on 27 December 2009 @ 16:08