The virtual battle space allows the radicalized individual to become directly involved in the jihad in a meaningful way. The activities that occur within the scope of eJihad - attacking enemy websites, operating jihadi websites, distributing and/or producing propaganda, pirating software, and stealing credit cards and identities, to name a few - amount to a kind of entry-level terrorism. Those who find these activities rewarding will likely seek to become more involved. The nature of the jihadi ideology is such that it promotes exactly this sort of escalation.  Jihad is an obligation - and cyberspace, by its participatory nature, is enabling.

Such initial forays into jihad-related illegal activity will be successful. The nature of criminal justice systems being what it is, even if an emergent mujahid comes immediately to the attention of the authorities, and even if a decision is made to investigate and prosecute his online activities, so much time will pass between the act and the state's response to the act that the perpetrator will have the impression that he has been successful. In addition, not all these activities are illegal in all jurisdictions, and even when they are, they may not be viewed as particularly serious or worthy of government attention. This will embolden the aspiring terrorist... and his comrades in arms.

This is not merely theoretical. We have seen now quite a few groups of highly motivated, self-organizing, jihadi terrorists who progressed from activities in cyberspace to activities in the real world. The case of Aabid Khan and his associates is one instance that demonstrates very clearly how differentials of motivation, association, and opportunity impact the homegrown terrorists' ability to achieve their deadly ambitions.

I recommend to you this report by Evan Kohlmann.