I recommend this report for the bibliography, as it does a good job of summarizing how Islamic extremists - as organized terrorist organizations, less formal gangs of self-organized or "homegrown" terror-supporting activists, and sundry individuals - attempt to use the Internet to further their own ends. I say "attempt" because there is a tendency when this subject comes up to assume that just because the bad guys are using the Internet they are doing so effectively, that just because the message is delivered it is also received clearly and in full. Evidence regarding effectiveness is lacking - at best we can measure the popularity of any given message and
Some reservations/concerns/comments:
The report states that a cohesive and comprehensive outreach and communications strategy should be put in place to assist the USA in confronting the threat of Islamist extremism. This line of reasoning leads to such as the recent DHS and State Department reports which ban the use of the word "jihad" from discussions of jihadi violence. This may appease a handful of moderate Muslims who cling to a more peaceful interpretation of the word, but such moderates are by definition not a threat to the rest of us, and as for the jihadis, they have the Quran and the life of the Prophet and his Companions to guide them as they attempt to wage a global holy war. In the scripture itself we find little to support an alternative definition of "jihad," and the Prophet's life was a life of war, not of peace or self-improvement. Jihadis don't become jihadis because we call them "jihadis." They become jihadis for their own reasons and they call themselves "jihadis."
The NYPD's report on radicalization is featured, but is treated as a linear, mechanistic process. Given the way the process is represented graphically in the NYPD report, such treatment is understandable.
I would note that the authors of the NYPD report specifically caution against taking such a view. The point of the NYPD report is that groups of individuals who pass through all four of the stages (in no particular or necessary order) are more likely to actually attempt to perpetrate an act of terror. The other thing that should be obvious from the NYPD report is that these homegrown groups, these self-organized gangs, are just that: gangs.
A final note: Why terror gangs form more often in some places than in others, other factors (e.g. government repression, poverty) being equal, is very similar to the issue of why juvenile delinquency and gang activity is more common in some communities than in others, other factors (e.g. poverty, discrimination) being equal. The successful terrorist, as in a political extremist who seeks to perpetrate or participate in acts of terror, will have more than merely the motivation to do so. He or she will need the benefit of associations and opportunities that enable their achieving such an ambition.
Posted on 25 May 2008 @ 14:21